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Abstract 
The paper points out that the modern formulation of Bohm’s quantum theory known as Bohmian 
mechanics is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion. We explain how this 
view can avoid the open questions that the traditional view faces according to which Bohm’s 
theory is committed to a wave-function that is a physical entity over and above the particles, 
although it is defined on configuration space instead of three-dimensional space. We then 
enquire into the status of the law of motion, elaborating on how the main philosophical options 
to ground a law of motion, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, can be applied to Bohmian 
mechanics. In conclusion, we sketch out how these options apply to primitive ontology 
approaches to quantum mechanics in general. 
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1. Introduction 
Bohmian mechanics provides for an ontology of non-relativistic quantum mechanics in terms 
of particles and their trajectories in physical space and time. It is a mathematically precise 
quantum theory of particles that grounds the formalism and the predictions of textbook 
quantum mechanics. The Bohmian law of motion is expressed by two equations, a guiding 
equation for the configuration of particles in three-dimensional space and the Schrödinger 
equation, describing the time-evolution of the wave-function, which enters the guiding 
equation. The mathematical form of the law is the following one: 
 
dQ(t)
dt = v
Ψt
￿
Q(t)
￿
(guiding equation),
i￿∂Ψt∂t = H Ψt (Schro¨dinger’s equation) 
 
In these equations, Q denotes the spatial configuration of N particles in three-dimensional 
space and Ψt the wave-function of that particle configuration at time t. The guiding equation 
involves the wave-function whose role is to yield a velocity vector field along which the 
particles move. The theory is a first order theory; that is to say, given the wave-function it is 
sufficient to specify the positions of all particles at a given time to calculate future and past 
motion. 
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When Bohm reintroduced the theory in 1952 (after de Broglie’s (1928) presentation of the 
equations) (Bohm 1952, see also Bohm and Hiley 1993, Holland 1993), he chose to write the 
wave-function in polar form for which the Schrödinger equation splits into two equations. 
One of them is analogous to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation albeit with an additional term, 
which he called the quantum potential. He then set out to explain various aspects of the 
motion of particles in terms of this quantum potential, an explanation that allowed to appeal 
to Newtonian intuitions. He called the theory a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, as 
if the “quantum force”, the gradient of the quantum potential, could be regarded as the cause 
of certain strange movements of the particles. 
The theory, being a first order theory no matter what, is however not Newtonian, and the 
explanatory value of Newtonian concepts like the one of the quantum potential is dubious. 
The version of the theory known today as Bohmian mechanics is committed only to particles 
and their positions; these are the local beables in Bell’s sense (Bell 1987, ch. 7) or the 
primitive ontology in the sense of Goldstein (1998). Furthermore, it is committed to a law of 
motion that describes how the positions of the particles develop in time. That’s all (see 
notably Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1997, Goldstein and Teufel 2001 and Dürr and Teufel 
2009 for a textbook presentation). In particular, Newtonian concepts like acceleration and 
forces do not enter the formulation of the theory, and velocities are not an additional, 
independent parameter. 
Bohmian mechanics, thus conceived, raises the question of the status of the law of motion 
and thereby the one of the status of the wave-function, since the wave-function figures in the 
law. This question has not been answered in a satisfactory manner in the philosophical 
literature as yet. The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible answers to this question. 
To start with, we recall the open questions that the traditional view of considering the wave-
function as an element of physical reality that guides the motion of the particles faces (section 
2). We then discuss two possible stances for grounding the law of motion in the primitive 
ontology of Bohmian mechanics: the Humean one that regards the law as a contingent 
regularity (section 3) and the one that anchors the law in a disposition of motion of the 
particles (section 4). We point out the advantages of dispositionalism (section 5). In 
conclusion, we briefly explain how the results of this paper apply to primitive ontology 
approaches to quantum mechanics in general (section 6). 
2. What is the ontological status of the wave-function? 
In order to understand the Bohmian law of motion, it is essential to have a clear idea about the 
objects appearing in its mathematical formulation. Bohmian mechanics starts from the 
concept of a universal wave-function, figuring in the fundamental law of motion for all the 
particles in the universe. That is, Q(t) describes the configuration of all the particles in the 
universe at time t and Ψt is the wave-function at time t, guiding the motion of all particles 
taken together. To apply the theory in physical situations of interest one uses concepts that 
allow the practical description of subsystems of the universe. This holds essentially for any 
fundamental physical theory. In Bohmian mechanics, the appropriate concept is that of an 
effective wave-function, in terms of which the description of a Bohmian subsystem is again 
Bohmian, that is, provided by equations of the same form as above. The status of those 
equations hence is different depending on whether we consider the physical description of the 
universe as a whole or of a subsystem thereof. Only the law of motion for all the particles in 
 The ontology of Bohmian mechanics  3
the universe together can be taken as fundamental, as opposed to effective descriptions of 
subsystems that are (fortunately) of the same form, but not on the same footing. 
The effective wave-functions are the Bohmian analogue of the usual wave-functions 
familiar from the standard formulation of quantum mechanics. They are the formal objects in 
the theory that are supposed to be epistemically accessible through local experiments, by 
preparation or by statistical analysis of microscopic systems. It is however important to bear 
in mind that they are not primitive, but derived from the universal wave-function and the 
actual spatial configuration of all the particles ignored in the description of the respective 
subsystem. The non-local law of Bohmian mechanics allows us to encode the influence of 
those particles, which are not part of the subsystem but nevertheless have an effect on its 
evolution, in a single object, the effective wave-function, which is defined as a function on 
the subsystem’s configuration space. 
This is done in the following way (see Dürr, Goldstein, Zanghì 1992 for more details): if 
we split the configuration space of the universe into degrees of freedom belonging to the 
subsystem (denoted by x) and the rest of the universe, we may regard only the first as a 
variable and insert into the universal wave-function the actual configuration Y(t) of all the 
particles not belonging to the subsystem. The function Ψt(x,Y(t)) on the configuration space 
of the x-system then contains all the degrees of freedom necessary to describe its dynamics. In 
many physically relevant situations it turns out that this function allows the autonomous 
Bohmian description of the subsystem whence Ψt(x,Y(t)) becomes the effective wave 
function ϕt(x) figuring in the guiding equation for the subsystem and satisfying an 
autonomous Schrödinger equation. The description of a Bohmian subsystem then requires the 
specification of both, the positions of the particles constituting the system and the effective 
wave-function describing their dynamics. The “state” of the subsystem at time t is thus 
naturally represented by a pair (qt, ϕt), where qt denotes the spatial configuration of the 
particles and ϕt their effective wave-function at time t. This “quantum state” is no reason for 
ontological unease, since it supervenes on the primitive ontology and the fundamental law of 
motion; it is nevertheless an objective, physical degree of freedom belonging to the subsystem 
(cf. Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 2011). 
How are we to think about those additional degrees of freedom when we consider a 
Bohmian subsystem? It is clear that they are not – and cannot be fancied as – internal degrees 
of freedom of the particles. Instead, we can achieve an intuitive physical description by 
conceiving a field or wave deploying in the system’s configuration space and determining the 
possible trajectories for the motion of the particles according to the guiding law. This picture 
of a pilot-wave or guiding field allows us to make sense of experimental situations such as the 
interference pattern observed in the double slit experiment: the particle trajectory goes 
through either one of the slits, but the effective wave-function passes through both and is 
subject to interference, which manifests itself in the statistical distribution of the arrival points 
of the particles on the screen after many repetitions of the experiment. If we could not tell this 
story, the theory would not provide any intuitive physical understanding of the phenomena. 
But to what extent shall we take this picture literally? It might seem natural to promote the 
heuristics to a fundamental ontology when instead of subsystems and effective wave-
functions we consider the whole universe and the fundamental universal wave-function. 
There is indeed a prima facie good reason to do so and to admit the wave-function as a further 
concrete physical entity in addition to the particles. Bohmian mechanics is not an action-at-a-
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distance theory. Given the wave-function as a function on configuration space, non-locality is 
manifested in the fact that the motion of any particle depends on the spatial configuration of 
the entire system. But the theory, as it stands, does not posit a concrete functional form of the 
wave-function in terms of the particle positions, and nothing in the formulation of the law 
suggests a reading of the dynamics in terms of direct particle interactions. Even more, the 
wave-function is described by a dynamical equation in its own right, an equation that is 
completely independent of the position or the motion of the particles. 
Thus, there are prima facie good reasons to conclude that the wave-function is something in 
addition to the primitive ontology, if the latter is taken to consist only of particle positions. In 
admitting the wave-function to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics, it seems, one has 
identified a physical entity that can account for the particular manner in which the particles 
move. In other words, acknowledging that Bohmian particles do not per se act on Bohmian 
particles, it is tempting to maintain that the wave-function does so: the particles move the way 
they do because the wave-function makes them do so. This seems to be very much the same 
story as before – the story of the guiding field –, except that the universal wave-function 
would have the task to guide the entire configuration of matter in the universe. It is thus no 
longer the kind of wave that can be prepared or propagate through anything. But first and 
foremost, the story is now supposed to be the one that nature tells, not just one that physicists 
tell about experiments. It will thus have to stand up to further scrutiny. 
If the wave-function is admitted as part of the ontology, the metaphor of a guiding field 
may suggest that it has to be understood just like the word says: as a physical field. It is 
however clear that it cannot be a field (or wave) of the usual kind, existing in three-
dimensional physical space. Instead, it would have to be conceived as a field on the high-
dimensional configuration space of the universe, implying thus that configuration space is not 
only a mathematical representation of configurations of N particles in three-dimensional 
physical space, but has to be granted a physical reality in its own right as a 3N-dimensional 
space (see e.g. Bell 1987, p. 128). The ontology then consists of N particles in physical space 
and the wave-function on configuration space, presumably acting on the one point in 
configuration space that corresponds, mathematically, to the actual configuration of matter in 
physical space. But such an ontology is problematic. The mathematical correspondence 
between points in configuration space and configurations in physical space is obvious. 
However, if one admits configuration space as a further stage of physical reality – in addition 
to and independent of three-dimensional physical space –, it is unclear how there could be a 
real connection between these two spaces that could amount to something existing in the one 
space guiding or piloting the motion of entities existing in the other one. 
This problem is well-known in the literature (see e.g. Monton 2006 for a clear formulation) 
and acknowledged even by adherents of Bohm’s theory (see e.g. Callender and Weingard 
1997, p. 35). There are several proposals that seek to avoid this problem while nevertheless 
retaining the ontology of a guiding field. One possibility consists in deleting the commitment 
to configuration space as being part and parcel of the physical ontology and in placing the 
wave-function in physical space, although it cannot be an ordinary field or wave. Forrest 
(1988, ch. 6.2) contemplates the idea of the wave-function representing a “polywave” in 
three-dimensional physical space, assigning properties to sets or tuples of N points instead of 
individual points. Norsen (2010) abandons the commitment to a single wave-function guiding 
the motion of the particles and associates with each particle an infinite number of fields in 
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three-dimensional space, thus seeking to achieve an ontology that is committed only to local 
beables. The other, more radical possibility is to take the opposite direction of Forrest and 
Norsen and to claim that the extremely high-dimensional space known as configuration space 
is itself the fundamental stage of physical reality, instead of three-dimensional space or four-
dimensional space-time. This idea is implemented in Albert’s marvellous point formulation of 
Bohmian mechanics (Albert 1996). In this case, this space is strictly speaking no longer a 
configuration space, since there is no given configuration of anything to which it is related. In 
general, however, it is fair to say that none of these attempts has been able to gain widespread 
acceptance so far (see in particular Monton 2002 and 2006 for a detailed criticism of Albert’s 
proposal). 
There is a common argument why the concept of a field (in all its variations) is 
inappropriate when discussing the nature of the wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. In 
quantum mechanics, the quantum state of a (closed) system is usually understood 
projectively. This is to say that it is represented by a ray in a Hilbert-space rather than by a 
single vector. In Bohmian mechanics (where the position representation is distinguished), this 
projective nature is manifested in the fact that for any complex number c, Ψ and cΨ give rise 
to the same equation of motion for the particles (even if we insist on Ψ being normalized, we 
have the gauge-freedom of multiplying it by any c-number of modulus one). Hence, it can be 
argued that the particular value that Ψ assigns to individual points in configuration space is 
meaningless and that the wave-function is threfore not the kind of physical object that we can 
call a “field”. 
Of course, we should be open-minded enough to concede that the ontology of a physical 
theory may contain other kinds of objects than just particles and fields. Insisting on an 
ontological interpretation of the wave-function, the fall-back position may thus be to say that 
the wave-function is an element of physical reality, although it does not come under any of 
the familiar categories. But why insist on the ontological interpretation in the first place? In 
fact, as far as the idea of the wave-function as a concrete physical entity is motivated by the 
desire to have something in the ontology that can serve as the cause for the motion of the 
particles, the whole endeavour seems doubtful. Bohmian mechanics does not tell us that 
particles without a guiding-field are at rest, while particles “acted upon” by a wave-function 
are moving – or anything of that kind. It rather tells us that certain wave-functions correspond 
to particles not moving at all, whereas other (generic) wave-functions correspond to particles 
moving in a particular way, as described by the guiding equation. 
In sum, there are well-founded reservations against taking the wave-function to be part of 
the ontology of Bohmian mechanics. The relationship between the wave-function and the 
motion of the particles is more appropriately conceived as a nomic one, instead of a causal 
one in terms of one physical entity acting on the other. This leads us to the nomological 
interpretation of the wave-function, as suggested by Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì (1997), 
Goldstein and Teufel (2001) and Goldstein and Zanghì (2012). 
If one abandons the commitment to the wave-function as a physical entity, the ontology 
consists only in the particles and their positions, each particle having exactly one, determinate 
spatio-temporal trajectory. Thus, for instance, in the double slit experiment with one particle 
at a time, the particle goes through exactly one of the two slits, and that is all there is in the 
physical world. There is no field or wave that guides the motion of the particle, propagates 
through both slits and undergoes interference. A non-local law of motion that says that the 
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development of the position of any particle (its velocity and thus its trajectory) depends on the 
positions of all the other particles, including the particles composing the experimental set-up, 
accounts for the observed particle positions on the screen. It is precisely for such instances 
that the non-local influence of the other particles can be encoded in the effective wave-
function, but there is no need to commit oneself to the associated intuition of a guiding field 
as the correct description of physical reality. 
A law of motion tells us what happens, or can happen or would happen in four-dimensional 
space-time (given the specification of initial conditions), but it is not itself an entity existing 
in space and time. By the same token, the wave-function, insofar as it figures in the law of 
motion, is a mathematical object defined on configuration space, instead of a physical object 
existing in addition to the particles. This is to say nothing more than that the formulation of a 
law of motion for the primitive ontology may contain mathematical objects that do not 
themselves correspond to physical objects. 
The nomological interpretation of the wave-function should obviously not result in 
replacing the problematic claim that “the wave-function moves the particles” with the even 
more problematic one that “the law moves the particles”. However, by studying the role of Ψ 
as it figures in the law, one can learn something informative about the meaning of this thing 
called “wave-function”. The answer one arrives at will however depend on what exactly one 
takes a physical law to be. There are two main views about laws of nature discussed in the 
philosophical literature. Both of them can be drawn upon for developing the nomological 
interpretation of the wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. The first possibility is to 
recognize only particles’ positions in the ontology, conceived as categorical properties, and to 
take the law to supervene on contingent facts about the distribution of the particles in space 
and time. On this view, the law has a merely descriptive function, but there nevertheless is an 
objective law of motion formulated in terms of a universal wave-function. The other 
possibility is to admit more in the ontology than just particles’ positions and to take the law, 
including the universal wave-function, to be grounded in what there thus is added to the 
ontology. In other words, the law is grounded in the nature or essence of the properties that 
the entities in space and time instantiate. These properties then are conceived as dispositions 
(in the sense of what one may call “law-making properties”, that is, properties for which it is 
essential to exercize a certain nomological role). 
Bohmian mechanics is also compatible with a primitivism about laws as advocated by 
Maudlin (2007). This view admits the law itself as part of the fundamental ontology. Applied 
to Bohmian mechanics, this view can limit itself to maintaining that there is nothing more to 
understand the meaning of the wave-function than to grasp its role in the formulation of the 
equation of motion for the primitive ontology. Note that according to this view, there is no 
sharp distinction between a nomological and an ontological interpretation of the wave-
function, since laws belong to the stock of physical reality as well. In brief, if one is prepared 
to accept laws as primitives, there is not much reason to worry about the status of the wave-
function in Bohmian mechanics in particular. However, if one does worry about the status of 
the wave-function, and if one considers Humeanism about laws to be unsatisfactory, then 
dispositionalism is to our mind the more attractive anti-Humean position (cf. also the review 
of Maudlin 2007 by Suárez 2009, p. 276): dispositionalism offers an account of what the 
wave-function stands for, instead of merely describing its role in a law that is accepted as 
primitive. In the following, we set out to show that the ontology of Bohmian mechanics can 
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be clearly stated and understood in terms of a standard metaphysical theory of properties that 
does not accept laws as primitive, be it a Humean theory, be it a dispositionalist one. 
3. Humeanism about laws 
Insisting on the fact that laws cannot move the entities in space and time, one may draw the 
conclusion that nothing does so. The view known as Humeanism about laws of nature 
implements this conclusion, going back to David Hume’s denial of necessary connections in 
nature (e.g. Hume 1748, section VII). According to this view, laws only have a descriptive 
function. The ontology consists in the distribution of particulars (such as particles and their 
positions) throughout the whole of space-time. Thus, David Lewis, the most prominent 
contemporary advocate of this position, advances the thesis of Humean supervenience, 
characterizing it in the following manner: 
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, 
just one little thing and then another. (…) We have geometry: a system of external relations of 
spatio-temporal distance between points. … And at those points we have local qualities: 
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be 
instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. … All else 
supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986a, pp. ix-x) 
On this view, the distribution of the fundamental physical properties over the whole of space-
time is entirely contingent: for each single token of a fundamental physical property at a 
space-time point (such as a particle being located at that point), it is conceivable and 
metaphysically possible to hold that token fixed and to vary all the other tokens. In particular, 
given a possible world that is a duplicate of the current state of the actual world, the 
development of the distribution of the fundamental physical properties in that possible world 
may be entirely different from the development of the distribution of the fundamental 
physical properties in the actual world. In short, the physical properties instantiated at any 
given space-time point or region do not impose any restrictions at all on the physical 
properties that can be instantiated at other space-time points or regions (see Beebee 2006). It 
is a contingent matter of fact that the distribution of the fundamental physical properties 
throughout space-time in the actual universe manifests certain regularities. Given that entire 
distribution, the laws of nature then are, according to Lewis, the axioms of the description of 
that distribution that achieves the best balance between logical simplicity and empirical 
content (e.g. Lewis 1973, pp. 72-75). 
Humeanism about laws is applicable to Bohmian mechanics. Assume that one knows the 
positions of all the particles in the universe throughout the whole history of the universe. The 
wave-function of the universe then is that description of the universe that achieves, at the end 
of the universe, the best balance between logical simplicity and empirical content. In other 
words, the wave-function of the universe supervenes on the distribution of the particles’ 
positions throughout the whole of space-time; the same goes for the law of motion. This 
supervenience relationship includes that the wave-function of the universe applies not only to 
the actual distribution of particle positions throughout space-time, but also to other possible 
distributions. Given that we are ignorant about the exact positions of the particles in the 
universe, we then get, through the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, to effective wave-
functions and quantum statistics as the best description we can achieve for subsystems of the 
universe (cf. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 1992). But note that on this view, only the universal 
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wave-function that supervenes on the particles’ positions throughout the whole history of the 
universe has a nomological status. No effective wave-function describing subsystems can 
claim such a status. 
Since Humeanism is applicable to Bohmian mechanics, one cannot simply jump to the 
conclusion that the mere fact of quantum entanglement refutes an atomistic worldview such 
as Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience (e.g. Teller 1986) or that such a thesis applies only 
to configuration space by contrast to four-dimensional, physical space-time (Loewer 1996, p. 
104). Quantum entanglement is a feature of the formalism of quantum mechanics. The 
question is what the appropriate ontology for this formalism is. If one elaborates on an 
ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of particle positions, as does Bohmian mechanics, 
and if one adopts the metaphysical stance of Humeanism, then one can maintain that (a) the 
entanglement is a feature only of the wave-function and that (b) the wave-function of the 
universe supervenes on the distribution of the particle positions throughout the whole of four-
dimensional, physical space-time. Consider the following quotation from Bell’s paper on 
“The theory of local beables” (1975): 
One of the apparent non-localities of quantum mechanics is the instantaneous, over all space, 
‘collapse of the wave function’ on ‘measurement’. But this does not bother us if we do not grant 
beable status to the wave function. We can regard it simply as a convenient but inessential 
mathematical device for formulating correlations between experimental procedures and 
experimental results, i.e., between one set of beables and another. Then its odd behaviour is 
acceptable as the funny behaviour of the scalar potential of Maxwell’s theory in Coulomb gauge. 
(quoted from Bell 1987, p. 53) 
Bell’s remark applies to quantum theories in terms of local beables in general: once one has 
specified what the local beables are (e.g. particle positions, or what is today known as flashes 
in Bell’s ontology for GRW – see Bell 1987, ch. 22), one is free to say that the local beables 
are all there is and that the quantum formalism is a mere means to formulate regularities in 
the distribution of the local beables in space-time. This is a coherent view (although not 
necessarily Bell’s considered view: when writing about Bohm’s theory, he usually urges a 
commitment to the wave-function as part of the ontology  – see e.g. Bell 1987, p. 128). 
If one takes this view, one is committed only to “a vast mosaic of local matters of particular 
fact” as Lewis puts it in the quotation above, consisting in the case of Bohmian mechanics in 
particle positions. The mosaic of the particle positions in the actual world happens to be such 
that on it supervenes an entangled wave-function figuring in a non-local law of motion. But 
there is no real physical relation of entanglement that exists as a non-supervenient relation in 
four-dimensional space-time in addition to the relations of spatio-temporal distance among 
the particle positions. By the same token, there is not any sort of a holistic physical property 
instantiated in space and time over and above the local particle positions. 
There are a number of substantial philosophical objections against Humeanism, which are, 
however, not relevant to the purpose of this paper (see e.g. Mumford 2004, part I). There is a 
common objection from physics, which may be taken to be pertinent in our context: on 
Humeanism, the laws of fundamental physics do not have any explanatory function. They 
sum up, at the end of the universe, what has happened in the universe; but they do not answer 
the question why what has happened did in fact happen, given certain initial conditions. In 
other words, as regards the domain of fundamental physics, Humeanism accepts all there is in 
that domain as a primitive fact. The reason is the above mentioned possibility of unrestricted 
 The ontology of Bohmian mechanics  9
combinations: for each single token of a fundamental physical property at a space-time point 
(such as a particle located at that point), it is conceivable and metaphysically possible to hold 
that token fixed and to vary all the other tokens. By way of consequence, there are no real 
connections among the property tokens occurring at space-time points, which could be 
revealed by a law and which could explain the temporal evolution of the distribution of the 
fundamental physical property tokens. 
However, one can with reason maintain that science in general – and fundamental physics 
in particular – searches for real connections in nature and that the stress that science lays on 
discovering laws derives from the idea that laws reveal the real connections that there are in 
nature instead of being mere devices of economical bookkeeping. Let us therefore enquire 
into another option to ground the laws of nature in the physical properties, namely 
dispositionalism and its applicability to Bohmian mechanics. 
4. Laws grounded in dispositions 
The main anti-Humean position about laws of nature in contemporary philosophy traces laws 
back to properties. According to this view, it is essential for a property to induce a certain 
behaviour of the objects that instantiate the property in question; the law then expresses that 
behaviour. A stock example is gravitational mass in Newtonian mechanics: in virtue of being 
massive, particles attract (accelerate) each other in the manner described by the Newtonian 
law of gravity. Obviously, the ambition of this account is not to tell us something new about 
the physics of Newtonian gravity, but to ground the law in the ontology, that is, to clarify how 
theoretical terms (expressed in the language of mathematics) connect to the entities existing in 
the physical world. The parameter we call “mass” refers to a property of the particles. This 
property is not a pure quality (for then the question how this property connects to a law would 
remain unanswered), but a disposition whose manifestation is the mutual attraction of the 
particles as expressed qualitatively and quantitatively by the law. 
In general, this view amounts to considering properties as dispositions to bring about 
certain effects; the laws supervene on the dispositions in the sense that they express what 
objects can do in virtue of having certain properties (e.g. Dorato 2005, Bird 2007). 
Consequently, laws are suitable to figure in explanations answering why-questions. On this 
view, as on Humeanism, laws do not belong to the ontology. However, in contrast to 
Humeanism, they are anchored in the essence of the properties of the objects that there are in 
the physical world, instead of being mere means of economical description. 
When applying this view to Bohmian mechanics, one has to be aware of the fact that it has 
nothing to do with the claim that all properties apart from position are contextual in Bohm’s 
theory; that claim is sometimes formulated in terms of all the other properties being 
dispositions that are actualized in certain measurement contexts. As regards the philosophical 
literature on properties as dispositions, it is misleading to talk in terms of dispositions in this 
respect, because dispositions are real and actual properties that exist in the world 
independently of any measurements. The so-called contextual properties, by contrast, simply 
are ways in which the particles move in certain contexts such as certain experimental set-ups 
and statistical descriptions that apply to those contexts (and that can be expressed by self-
adjoint operators as bookkeeping devices). But these “contextual properties” are not 
fundamental. Strictly speaking, they are not properties of anything at all, and there is nothing 
of philosophical interest in them (as there is nothing of philosophical interest in self-adjoint 
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operators). The point at issue is whether the fundamental physical properties in Bohmian 
mechanics are dispositions and whether it is in this manner that they ground the law of 
motion. 
In a recent paper, Belot (2012) discusses the option of tracing the Bohmian law of motion 
back to dispositions. Over and above the position of each particle, Belot countenances a 
disposition that determines the velocity of the particles as an additional, holistic property of 
the system of particles under consideration. He characterizes this view in the following 
manner: 
That is, let us explore an interpretation of Bohmian mechanics under which the complete history 
of a quantum system is specified by specifying for each time t a configuration q(t) of the 
particles together with the dispositional property Φt that tells us, for each possible configuration 
of the system of particles at t, what the velocity of each particle would be were that configuration 
actual. On this interpretation, all we have are particles and properties of (systems of) particles—
at each time, each particle has a mass and a position and the system of particles as a whole has a 
further dispositional property. Let us call this approach the dispositionalist interpretation of 
Bohmian mechanics. (p. 78) 
On this view, the universal wave-function Ψt of the system of particles at a given time is a 
mathematical object that represents the disposition to move in a certain manner at that time. 
This disposition is a holistic property of all the particles in the universe together – that is, a 
relational property that takes all the particles as relata. It induces a certain temporal 
development of the particle configuration, that development being its manifestation. In other 
words, given a spatial configuration of the particles (actual or counterfactual) and the 
disposition of motion at a time as represented by the wave-function as input, the Bohmian law 
of motion yields the velocities of the particles at that time as output. 
Again, what needs to be emphasized and may have remained unclear in Belot’s exposition, 
is that only the universal wave-function has a nomological status. It would be a 
misunderstanding to apply nomological interpretations to wave-functions of any odd physical 
system and to seek to ground such wave-functions in dispositions. The effective wave-
function of a subsystem defines an equation of motion for the particles constituting that 
subsystem, but it cannot be seen as expressing the disposition of motion of those particles, 
since only the disposition of motion of the totality of particles in the universe can serve as the 
ontological basis for the law of motion. 
Given that the disposition of motion is a property of all the particles in the universe 
together, it cannot be but a disposition that produces its manifestation spontaneously, that is, a 
certain form of motion of the particles; this disposition cannot require an external stimulus, 
since there is nothing external to the totality of all the particles in the universe. There is no 
metaphysical reason to hold that dispositions necessarily depend on external triggering 
conditions for their manifestation. If the fundamental physical properties are regarded as 
dispositions, it is reasonable to assume that they manifest themselves spontaneously. Coming 
back to the mentioned stock example of a fundamental physical disposition, in Newtonian 
gravity, particles spontaneously attract each other in virtue of their mass. 
Belot (2012) formulates an objection to the dispositionalist interpretation of Bohmian 
mechanics, suggesting that dispositions alone may not tell the entire story about the physical 
matter of facts. Concretely, he considers a single Bohmian particle in a one-dimensional box 
and points out that there are countably many real-valued wave-functions corresponding to 
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different energy eigenstates, but representing the same disposition of motion, as they all 
describe a particle that is at rest at all times. He concludes: 
Observations of this sort may seem to all but scupper the dispositionalist interpretation: for it 
may well appear that in taking dispositional histories rather than histories of the quantum state to 
be fundamental, the dispositionalist interpretation discards a great deal of the essential physical 
content of quantum mechanics. (p. 80) 
Such worries do not apply to the account presented here. We have already emphasized that 
only the common disposition of motion of all the particles in the universe together is 
fundamental. But if the “dispositional histories” involve the spatial configuration and the 
disposition of motion for all there is in the universe, there is no physical content left that 
would be unaccounted for. Note that energy is not a primitive quantity in Bohmian 
mechanics. The universal wave-function can be an eigenstate of the universal Hamiltonian 
(and will be, in fact, if it is stationary), but the corresponding eigenvalue has no physical 
meaning. Energy plays a physical role in the description of subsystems. Hence, we should 
indeed worry about the energy of the system “particle in a box” if we could stick our hand in 
it. If, however, that single particle was all there is in the entire universe, expressing its law of 
motion in terms of different real-valued wave-functions, corresponding to different 
eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian, would not describe different physical facts. 
Still, the observation that even the entire history of dispositions of motion does not 
necessarily determine a unique (universal) wave-function is obviously correct. Many different 
wave-functions may give rise to the same law of motion. One may find this fact 
unsatisfactory. However, we have left the idea of treating the wave-function as an additional 
physical object behind in section 2. If one regards the wave-function as a formal object 
appearing in the mathematical formulation of the law, there is no need to insist on the 
relationship between the fundamental disposition of motion and its representation in terms of 
a universal wave-function on configuration space being one-to-one. Let us bear in mind that 
mathematical representations need to be unambiguous only as far as the elements of physical 
reality and the fundamental laws are concerned. It is a further advantage of primitive ontology 
theories that they enable us to make such distinctions in a clear-cut way. 
In a manuscript available on his website, Thomson-Jones (2012) also suggests a 
dispositionalist reading of the wave-function in Bohmian mechanics. By contrast to Belot 
(2012) and to our view, Thomson-Jones attributes to each particle a multitude of dispositions 
for various motions in three-dimensional space whose manifestation depends on the positions 
of all the other particles (the dispositions of the other particles are the triggering conditions 
for the dispositions of the particle in question). However, let us recall that the wave-function 
enters Bohmian mechanics through the role it plays in the law of motion (the guiding 
equation) by fixing the velocity of the particles and that only the universal wave-function has 
a nomological status. The rationale for introducing dispositions in the ontology of Bohmian 
mechanics is to ground the law of motion in the ontology while being committed only to 
entities that exist in physical space and time. Consequently, since there is only one universal 
wave-function, and since the universal wave-function is in any case non-separable, there is no 
reason to commit oneself to anything more than sparse dispositions: there is exactly one 
disposition that fixes the form of motion of all the particles by fixing their velocities, thus 
fixing the temporal development of the configuration of particles. That single disposition is 
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sufficient to account for the motion of any particle (or any sub-collection of particles) in all 
possible circumstances. 
There is another common objection to the nomological interpretation in general and its 
dispositionalist variant in particular, which derives from the following observation: if the 
fundamental wave-function of the universe is conceived merely as a formal object figuring in 
the law of motion for the particles, it may seem strange that it follows a dynamical equation 
itself and hence gives rise to a law of motion which is time-dependent (or rather, “time-
indexed”). In reply to this objection, let us note in the first place that dispositionalism can in 
principle accommodate the idea of laws being time-dependent. Laws can be grounded in the 
dispositions that the objects in the universe instantiate at a given time. Thus, if the disposition 
for a certain form of motion of the configuration of particles in the universe is time-
dependent, so is the universal wave-function that is grounded in that disposition and, 
consequently, the law of motion. This would mean that time is not only parameterizing the 
motion of the particles, but that the particles are somehow sensitive to the precise value of 
that parameter, as if they carried a little clock with them. In other words, the particles have not 
just the disposition to move in a certain way, given a certain spatial configuration, but that 
disposition also depends on what time it is in the universe. We would find this somewhat 
strange, but we see no a priori reason why the universe could not be like that. 
Nonetheless, dispositionalism about laws, as applied to Bohmian mechanics, is by no 
means committed to this view. It is reasonable to suppose that if there were two identical 
spatial configurations of the universe but at different times, these configurations would 
behave in exactly the same way. In brief: same spatial configuration of all the particles in the 
universe, same disposition of motion. Taking this view then commits us to the supposition 
that the universal wave-function that enters the Bohmian guiding equation is time-
independent – a supposition that is in fact less bold than often alleged. 
Note that, pace Belot (2012, pp. 74-77), one is not automatically committed to enter into 
the even more controversial issue of a quantum theory of gravity if one envisages a time-
independent Bohmian law of motion: one can conceive a quantum theory with a universal 
wave-function that is a stationary solution of the Schrödinger equation without that quantum 
theory having to include gravitational degrees of freedom. In Bohmian mechanics, a wave-
function can define a non-trivial dynamics for the motion of particles without itself evolving 
in time. Bohmian mechanics is not hit by the notorious problem of time that plagues the usual 
approaches to a universal wave-function (especially in quantum gravity). In other words, the 
common dilemma of either having to countenance a time-dependent wave-function or facing 
the problem of time does not apply to Bohmian mechanics. The reason is that the wave-
function does not provide the ontology of the theory. The ontology, the stuff that moves in 
space and time (or the geometry of space-time itself), is external to the wave-function. The 
latter only enters into the equation of motion for the entities posed in the primitive ontology. 
Hence, if one replaces the time-dependent wave-function in the guiding equation with a time-
independent one, that equation still yields as output the velocities of the particles in the 
universe at time t. It is only that in this case, it is irrelevant what time it is in order to 
determine the velocities of the particles, given their positions. 
Furthermore, let us bear in mind that it is very well possible for effective wave-functions to 
have a non-trivial (Schrödinger-type) evolution in time, even if the fundamental wave-
function of the universe from which they are derived is stationary. The time-dependence of 
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the effective wave-functions then comes only from the evolution of the spatial configuration 
Y(t) of the particles that are not part of the described subsystem (see Goldstein and Teufel 
2001 for details). In brief, the universal wave-function entering the guiding equation may very 
well be a stationary solution of the universal Schrödinger equation and still account for the 
usual quantum behaviour of subsystems as described by effective wave-functions and their 
Schrödinger equations. The Schrödinger equation for the universal wave-function is then to 
be regarded not as a dynamical equation, but (similar to the Wheeler-deWitt equation) as a 
constraint on the universal wave-function, stipulating its time-independence. 
5. Advantages of dispositionalism 
In section 2, we have pointed out problematic aspects of admitting the wave-function as part 
of the ontology. These aspects can be divided into the following two ones: the status of 
configuration space and the ability of the wave-function to guide the motion of particles in 
physical space. Let us now consider how dispositionalism can improve on these issues. 
The spatial configuration of a universe of N particles at time t is represented by a vector 
Q(t) ∈ IR3N. This vector can be regarded as a point in configuration space, but represents the 
actual configuration of the particles in three-dimensional physical space. The 3N-dimensional 
configuration space is usually understood as the mathematical representation of all possible 
configurations of N particles existing in three-dimensional physical space. Regarding the 
universal wave-function as a complex-valued function Ψ(x), the variable x then ranges over 
all possible spatial configurations of the universe. A tension now arises when this function is 
supposed to represent a physical field, existing as a concrete entity in the actual physical 
world. Then, one either has to argue that the space of possible configurations somehow 
supervenes on the actual configuration of the particles in physical space, or grant it an 
independent reality in addition to three-dimensional physical space. 
The dispositionalist, by contrast, has no such troubles. In being located in a certain manner 
in three-dimensional physical space, the particles have the disposition to move in a certain 
way. The universal wave-function, as a function on configuration space, represents that 
disposition, concerning, notably, all possible configurations of the particles, actual and 
counterfactual. At time t, the disposition of motion is instantiated only by the actual 
configuration of the universe at that time, corresponding, formally, to evaluating the function 
Ψt (or rather the guiding equation) at Q(t). Nonetheless, qua being a disposition and thus a 
modal property, it grounds the truth value for counterfactual propositions stating how the 
particles would move if another configuration were the actual one. In brief, on 
dispositionalism, the truth value of all counterfactual propositions is grounded in what 
actually exists in the physical world, namely the disposition of motion of the particles. 
Concerning the second issue, the commitment to dispositions obviously fulfils the task of 
providing in the ontology for something that is able to account for the motion of the particles. 
From a philosophical point of view, nothing speaks against considering the disposition for a 
certain form of motion as a causal property, although it is not a force or a potential, simply 
because its essence is to do something, namely to fix a certain velocity with which the 
particles move. Consequently, the law of motion grounded in this disposition can be regarded 
as a causal law, giving rise to causal explanations, whereby the efficient cause for the motion 
of the particles is situated in the particles themselves. 
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In short, there is a disposition for a certain form of motion as a property of the particles 
instead of a field or a pilot-wave external to the particles that is supposed to move them. 
Nonetheless, it may seem that the dualism of entities has simply been replaced with a dualism 
of properties. On the one hand, one may argue, there is position as an intrinsic and categorical 
property of each of the particles, and on the other hand, there is a disposition of motion as a 
relational and dispositional property of the particles. One may also consider the velocity of 
the particles as a further property. 
In reply to this query, let us note the following three points: (1) There is no problem of 
connection of the various properties admitted in the ontology, if all elements of the ontology 
are located in physical space and, moreover, if all properties are properties of the particles. In 
other words, even if there is a dualism of properties, it does not give rise to the objections that 
hit the dualistic ontology of particles in physical space and a field on configuration space. (2) 
Insofar as there is a dualism of a disposition for a certain form of motion and the velocity of 
the particles as its manifestation, it is not troublesome. It rather is an analytic dualism: if one 
recognizes dispositions, one also has to admit properties that are the manifestations of the 
dispositions in question (otherwise there would be no dispositions). (3) As regards the 
relationship between the position of the particles and their disposition for a certain form of 
motion, one can maintain that position also is a relational property, consisting in a relation of 
spatial or spatio-temporal distance among the particles (if one does not presuppose the 
existence of an absolute space or at least does not conceive the location of a particle at a point 
in absolute space as an intrinsic property of the particle). 
Going one step further, the dispositionalist does not even have to concede that position, 
conceived as spatial or spatio-temporal relations among the particles, is a categorical property 
by contrast to a dispositional one (so that in the end, there is no dualism of dispositional and 
categorical properties). For instance, in general relativity theory, one can regard the spatio-
temporal, metrical relations as including the disposition to move the particles (since the 
metrical relations yield the manifestation of gravitation). The Bohmian law of motion, 
grounded in dispositions, may justify a similar claim: in virtue of standing in certain spatial or 
spatio-temporal relations, the particles have the disposition to move in a certain manner. It 
may therefore well turn out that in the end, there is only one type of physical properties, 
namely relations that are dispositions or that bestow dispositions to move on the system of 
particles. In any case, one can say that in standing in spatial relations (being localized), the 
particles have the disposition to move in a certain manner (change in their spatial relations), 
making thus clear that there is no separation between these two properties. 
Let us finally compare dispositionalism with Humeanism. Whereas the Humean admits 
only particle positions conceived as categorical properties as ontologically primitive, the 
dispositionalist regards the particle positions as including a disposition for a certain form of 
motion. Due to this disposition, there are real connections in nature in a twofold sense: first of 
all, since the disposition of motion is a holistic property of all the particles taken together, it 
establishes a real connection among the particles – a real, irreducible relation over and above 
the external, geometrical relations of spatial distance. Furthermore, since this disposition 
induces a certain form of motion of the particles, it establishes a real connection (a causal 
connection having the ontological status of a real connection) between the configuration of 
the particles in the universe at a given time and that configuration at future times. Basing 
oneself on this disposition, one can therefore explain the temporal development of the 
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configuration of the particles in the universe, given an initial state (that is, an initial 
configuration of particle positions). 
One may grant that dispositionalism, by contrast to Humeanism, is able to explain the 
development of the universe by admitting real connections. However, one may object that 
dispositionalism does not fare better than Humeanism when it comes to explaining the most 
striking feature of quantum mechanics, namely the non-locality that is, for instance, revealed 
in the EPR-Bohm experiment (but also already implicit in the double slit experiment). 
Dispositionalism accepts a disposition of motion as a holistic property of the totality of the 
particles in the universe as primitive. It can thus not explain why this disposition is a holistic 
property rather than a property that belongs to each particle considered individually. 
However, one can retort that calling for such an explanation expresses a wrong-headed 
presupposition rather than a sound demand. Quantum non-locality can with reason be taken to 
be a fundamental feature of nature. Calling for an explanation of it is possible only against the 
background of assuming that the natural state of affairs is one of locality. Whereas the 
experience of our macroscopic environment may suggest such a view, it is by no means self-
evident; Bohmian mechanics can explain why the non-locality of quantum mechanics is not 
manifest in everyday experience. But a priori, there is no reason why the temporal 
development of what there is in the universe should be determined by local rather than by 
holistic properties. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, let us put the argument of this paper into the wider framework of approaches 
that consider the formalism of quantum mechanics as representing or referring to a physical 
reality that is external to this formalism and that cannot be derived from it (by contrast to 
approaches that accept the quantum formalism, that is the wave function and / or the 
observables, as irreducible and seek to establish solely on this basis a link with experience). 
Theories in this vein describe the quantum world in terms of what is known as a primitive 
ontology – “primitive” because the ontology cannot be read off from the formalism but has to 
be posed as that to what the formalism refers. In other words, none of the objects appearing in 
the formulation of textbook quantum mechanics can be straightforwardly taken to represent 
stuff existing in time and space, but we can achieve an understanding of those objects by 
inquiring into their relation to the primitive ontology, once the latter has been established as 
that what the formalism is actually about. Bohmian mechanics is the most elaborate approach 
in this sense: particles in three-dimensional space make up the primitive ontology, and a 
guiding equation is provided that describes their motion and into which the quantum 
mechanical wave-function enters. Other proposals for a primitive ontology include density of 
stuff in three-dimensional space as in the GRW mass density interpretation (Ghirardi et al. 
1995) and flashes occurring at points in four-dimensional space-time as in the GRW flash 
interpretation (Bell 1987, p. 205, Tumulka 2006) (see Allori et al. 2008 for an illuminating 
comparison between these approaches). 
Primitive ontology approaches face the difficulty that what is posed as the primitive 
ontology in three-dimensional space does in itself not contain anything that accounts for the 
temporal development of the elements of that ontology (particle positions in Bohmian 
mechanics). This shortcoming then motivates an ontological dualism, admitting both the 
elements of the primitive ontology in three-dimensional space and the wave-function in 
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configuration space as constituting physical reality. However, as pointed out in section 2, it is 
doubtful whether the wave-function in configuration space is suitable to fill this lacuna. 
Following the spirit of the idea to regard the formalism of quantum mechanics as a means of 
representation that refers to a physical reality external to it, one gets to the view of the wave-
function being nomological rather than being an element of physical reality – or, more 
generally speaking, to the idea of the formalism of quantum mechanics providing for a law, 
such as the Bohmian law of motion (or the GRW law if the standard formalism is modified to 
a non-linear equation for the wave-function). It would then obviously be misguided to call for 
a one-to-one correspondence between the mathematical objects entering the formulation of 
the law and the elements of physical reality. 
The purpose of this paper has been to further develop that nomological stance. There are 
two main options open if one sets out to do so. One option is to abandon the call for 
something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal development of the entities that are 
posed in the primitive ontology. A central result of this paper is that this can be done in a 
clear and consistent manner. The mere fact of the existence of primitive ontology approaches 
to quantum mechanics and their empirical adequacy refutes the widespread impression that 
quantum mechanics contradicts Humeanism – more precisely, Lewis’ thesis of Humean 
supervenience: the world according to quantum mechanics can be “a vast mosaic of local 
matters of particular fact”, namely the spatio-temporal distribution of the elements posed in 
the primitive ontology such as particle positions. The universal wave-function and the laws of 
quantum mechanics supervene on this distribution. They are nothing more than devices of 
economical bookkeeping, there being no real connections among the elements of the primitive 
ontology (such as a real relation of entanglement); there is only a non-dynamical background 
structure of space-time geometry into which these elements are inserted. 
The other option is to conceive the elements of the primitive ontology as including a 
disposition to develop in a certain manner in time. That disposition then grounds the law of 
motion in the sense that the law expresses or reveals that disposition. Given the fact of 
quantum non-locality, that disposition has to be conceived as a holistic property of the 
elements of the primitive ontology – in non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics, a property of all 
the particles at a given time taken together (in a relativistic setting, “given time” will have to 
be appropriately understood, for example by specifying a space-like hypersurface). One 
important message of our analysis is that the nomological interpretation can be consistently 
applied only to the fundamental wave-function referring to all local beables in the universe 
together. This fundamental universal level has to be distinguished from the effective 
description of subsystems, which is, in the end, what the usual quantum formalism is about. 
The holistic disposition grounding the law is part and parcel of the primitive ontology, 
since it is not derived from anything and belongs to that what the quantum formalism 
represents or refers to. It is a beable existing in three-dimensional space, albeit not a local one. 
A further major result of this paper hence is that in endorsing dispositionalism, one can 
include something in the ontology that accounts for the temporal development of the local 
beables, without having to resort to accepting the wave-function in configuration space as an 
element of physical reality. One advantage of the particle ontology is that the disposition can 
be understood as a holistic property of the local beables themselves, whereas in the GRW-
theory, spatial localization of the mass-density or flashes has to be regarded as the 
manifestation of the disposition (see Dorato and Esfeld 2010 for dispositions in GRW). 
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On the question of Humeanism versus dispositionalism we side with dispositionalism, since 
we take it to be a sound demand to call for something in the ontology that accounts for the 
temporal development of the elements of physical reality and that grounds the law of motion, 
thus providing for real connections in nature. Let us stress once again that the dualism of 
properties to which we are thus committed is only an appearance, a mere heuristic device to 
introduce dispositions. As explained above, there are not different types of properties 
assigned to the elements of the primitive ontology, spatial positions and velocities as 
categorical, local properties and in addition to that a holistic, dispositional property for a 
certain temporal development of these entities that fixes the velocities. There simply are 
beables that in being localized have the common disposition to develop in a certain manner in 
time. However, we are aware of the fact that clearing up the relationship between position and 
the disposition for temporal development (particles’ positions and their holistic disposition of 
motion in Bohmian mechanics) is an open research project rather than a subject with 
established results. But the mere possibility of opening up that research question may be taken 
to be a further advantage of dispositionalism, showing that it is a promising programme for 
further research in the foundations of physics. 
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